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246 GLORIOUS CHEESES OR THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION ON SMALL AND EMERGING BUSINESS
by
David Schoenbrod*
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) oversees a "top-down" approach to envi-
ronmental protection in which appointed officials in Washington, D.C. impose detailed
requirements on a diverse nation. This largely unaccountable, highly centralized mode
of lawmaking does not necessarily produce better environmental quality than would a
more accountable and decentralized alternative. It does, however, disproportionately
harm small and emerging businesses because it produces an inefficient mix of emission
limits, subjects sources to superfluous bureaucratic procedures, and discriminates
against new sources. Large corporations have adapted to the top down approach and
even benefit from it because they can pass its costs along to consumers and are protected
from competition. In contrast, small and emerging businesses lack the infrastructure to
cope with the bureaucratic complexity and find it harder to start up the new sources
that they need to compete. The costs of EPA 's heavy hand thus fall not on entrenched
corporate interests but rather on those who dream of growing their own businesses and
ordinary citizens.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is pleasant to contemplate delicious foods, but not the cost of envi-
ronmental protection.
I conjure up the food in the form of glorious cheese to induce you,
the reader, to consider those depressing costs of environmental regula-
tion; but, I will get to the cheese in the end.
Most Americans think environmental regulators should disregard
cost in protecting health from pollution.' Many people apparently think
that bringing up the costs of environmental protection is a ploy to get
them to sacrifice their own health to line the pocket of someone else,
with that someone else being a corporate fat cat. The Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Carol Browner, played to
such sentiment when she stated, "If the day comes when we find ourselves
subjecting the health protections of our children and our most vulnera-
ble citizens to the outcome of cost-benefit analysis-literally putting a
price on their heads-we will have dishonored our past and devalued our
future."2
Those who urge considering cost in environmental regulation pre-
sent choice targets for such demagoguery. The most publicized studies of
the economic impact of environmental regulations focus on the total cost
of protection rather than the marginal cost of incremental increases in
the degree of protection.3 Opponents of regulation present the costs this
way to make them look large. This tactic is self-defeating because the
implicit message is that saving the costs requires ending all protection
from the threat. Proponents of regulation, such as EPA, have their own
reason to focus on total costs rather than marginal costs. 4 Each additional
increment of environmental protection tends to cost more and bring less
benefit. By comparing the total costs and benefits of environmental pro-
tection, not the marginal costs and benefits, EPA conflates the huge ben-
efits and small costs of the first steps to improve environmental quality
with the smaller benefits and larger costs of the later steps. It thereby
frames the issue as: "Do you support EPA or would you rather have no
protection from pollution?"
Because it is crazy to talk of getting rid of the environmental protec-
tion, this Essay will not discuss the total impact of environmental protec-
1 The Gallup Organization, Gallup Poll News Service (April 3-9, 2000), at http://
www.gallup.com//poll/surveys/2000/toplineOOO403/ql5tl9.asp.
2 Carol M. Browner, Remarks to the National Press Club (October 3, 2000),
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/speeches/cmbpr103.pdf.
3 See, e.g., Michael Hazilla & RaymondJ. Kopp, Social Cost of Environmental Quality
Regulations: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 98J. POL. ECON. 853 (1990).
' EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR AcT, 1970 TO 1990 (1997),
http://www.epa.gov/airprogm/oar/sect812/copy.html.
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tion on small and emerging business. It will instead compare the impact
of the present system of EPA protection with that of another way to pro-
tect public health and the environment.
There is a better way. Most environmental problems are local or
regional and should be handled by local or state government. Most ques-
tions of environmental regulation cannot be resolved solely by science,
but ride in the end on judgments of policy. The responsibility for those
policy choices should rest squarely on the shoulders of the elected policy
makers in elected legislatures and not be fobbed off on bureaucrats. In
brief, environmental policy should not come from the top down with EPA
on top, but should come from the people up with the people's desire for
sensible health protection filtered through elected legislators, mainly at
the state and local level.
My aim is not to scuttle environmental protection through a change
in process. The Environmental Protection Agency is only a brand name
for one way to deliver environmental quality. In fact, most progress on
environmental protection has come from other institutions. Looking
back over the long haul of air pollution control, the United States has
made steady progress from 1900 to the present, and there is no discerni-
ble acceleration in the rate of progress around 1970 when EPA took
over. 5 Moreover, the most dramatic improvements after 1970 at the
national level came from rules of conduct enacted by Congress, not from
regulations promulgated by EPA. 6
It is true that the states were far from perfect environmental guardi-
ans before 1970, but the federal government was also often a stinker.
Thinking back to the early 1970s, the federal government was-to the
alarm of environmentalists-channeling streams into concrete gutters,
developing the fast breeder reactor, carelessly granting leases for off-
shore oil drilling, mismanaging national forests, over grazing national
lands, failing to curb the use of DDT, and more.
The point is not that EPA has chosen to push regulation to the point
where the costs are excessive in relation to the benefits, although that is
true in many instances. 7 In other instances, EPA has failed for long peri-
ods of time to regulate pollution of great public concern. EPA was woe-
5 INDUR M. GoKLANY, CLEARING THE AIR: THE REAL STORY OF THE WAR ON AIR
POLLUTION 125-27 (1999).
6 David Schoenbrod, Remarks to the Board of Trustees of the National
Resources Defense Council (Mar. 12, 1997), in 20 CARDozo L. Rrv. 767, 768 (1999).
7 ROBERT W. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE ECONOMICS
AND POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR 50 (1983) (reviewing Hahn's work at the Brookings-AEI
center). A stunning example is Dr. Lois Gold's work showing that EPA's pesticide
regulations are premised on the assumption that people take in thousands of times,
or even hundreds of thousands of times, more pesticides than the FDA finds in the
food available at the supermarket. Mainstream scientists like Dr. Gold find that
synthetic pesticides account for less than 1% of human cancers. Dr. Gold also points
out that food we eat contains approximately two thousand times more natural
pesticides than synthetic and that natural ones appear to be no less carcinogenic. See
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fully slow in dealing with lead in gasoline, carcinogenic air pollution, and
interstate pollution. The point is that EPA is the wrong institution to
impose environmental regulations on the nation. One reason for this is
that the way EPA goes about its job unnecessarily inflates the costs for
everyone, especially small and emerging business.
This proposal for devolution and non-delegation is highly controver-
sial and raises many questions. I have dealt with such questions in previ-
ous publications8 and will deal with them comprehensively in a book in
progress.9 Instead of retracing that ground, this Essay will argue that the
present top-down approach to environmental protection harms small and
emerging business.
Part II of this Essay characterizes the present top-down approach to
environmental policy making. Part III identifies the superfluous burdens
that this approach imposes on small and emerging business. Part IV dis-
cusses EPA's reaction to complaints about these burdens. Part V tries to
imagine what the world would look like without these burdens. Part VI
shows that the trade-off is not between our health and the wealth of cor-
porate fat cats, but between EPA's power and our ability to pursue
happiness.
II. THE TOP-DOWN APPROACH
The Clean Air Act exemplifies the top-down approach. 10 In 1970, the
Act mandated that EPA protect the health of all Americans from all
harmful pollutants by the end of the 1970s regardless of the cost.1 1 The
goal of protecting health from pollution without regard to cost, as attrac-
tive as it may sound, is only an ideal until there are laws requiring persons
to reduce pollution to the required extent. Except for the very important
law requiring auto manufacturers to build cleaner cars, Congress did not
enact the rules of private conduct, such as emission limits on specific
kinds of plants, needed to achieve its goal in the Clean Air Act. That job
was left to EPA and the states, which were to be under EPA's thumb.
Thus, Congress enacted not laws, but an ideal.
In legislating by ideal, Congress does only half thejob of making law;
it creates rights without imposing corresponding duties. It does the popu-
lar part of lawmaking and shuns the unpopular part. The "lawmakers" in
Congress further distanced themselves from responsibilities by authoriz-
ing the lawmakers at EPA to couch their requirements as unfunded man-
dates that the states must implement. As a result, unelected officials at the
STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION
23 (1993).
s See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, TIME, supra note *; Schoenbrod, supra note 6; DAVID
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY- How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE
THROUGH DELEGATION chs. 4, 9 (1993).
9 DAVID SCHOENBROD, THIS EARTH, OUR REPUBLIC (forthcoming 2003).
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 7 4 01- 7 671 q (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
11 Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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EPA in Washington, D.C., are empowered to impose their vision of good
laws on society.
It is a mistake to think Congress could do a better job by legislating
ideals instead of rules of conduct. In legislating ideals, Congress disen-
gages itself from the interests that must give way if the ideals are to be
realized. Legislators cannot know whether they really believe in achieving
their loudly proclaimed ideals until they face up to those interests. It
turned out that achieving the ideal of the 1970 Clean Air Act would have
required taking most of the cars off the road in Los Angeles and halting
construction of new factories in many areas with high unemployment. No
one in public office was willing to defend such measures.
It is no good trying to excuse this legislative idealism on the basis
that there is time enough for Congress to face the hard choices after the
ideal is enacted. Statutes that launch regulatory ideals, such as the right
to clean air, are not trial balloons. With regulatory ideals, like entitle-
ments, people come to depend upon what Congress has seemingly given
them. Once we get something from government, it feels like a right. We
fight to keep those rights even if we would not have missed getting them
in the first place. Besides, repealing an enacted ideal requires going
through the Constitution's legislative process. The House, the Senate,
and the president were each given a say in enacting statutes so that gov-
ernment would not act rashly. By legislating ideals, Congress blunts the
procedural checks on acting rashly. Yet when rash action does result,
those checks come into full play to impede new legislation to temper it.
In addition, once Congress legislates a new ideal, a subgovernment-an
agency and symbiotic interest groups-grows up around the ideal to
defend it.
The Clean Air Act is a case in point. In 1977, Congress amended the
Act to avoid those consequences that caused visible distress to large num-
bers of voters, including turning Los Angeles into a pedestrian mall. How-
ever, Congress left in place both the ideal of healthy air regardless of cost
and the politically convenient device of empowering EPA to make up the
rules that the Agency believed were necessary to achieve that ideal. 12 As a
practical matter, this has meant that Congress will not interfere so long as
EPA does not cause highly visible harm to large numbers of voters. EPA is
thus free to frustrate small and emerging business so long as it is done
piecemeal.
The Clean Air Act, and the many statutes modeled on it, allow EPA
to run major segments of civil society on quasi-military lines through a
chain of command that runs from Congress down through the Agency to
states and ultimately the regulated entities.' 3 The result is a relentlessly
12 The 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act avoided the most dire
consequences by extending the deadline for achieving the primary ambient air
quality standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994).
13 See, e.g., id. §§ 7408-7410, 7501-7515.
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detailed system of control. Instead of limiting total emissions from each
plant, the regulatory system frequently places a separate emission limit on
every one of the many smokestacks, pipes, and vents coming out of the
typical plant. The system specifies outlet-by-outlet emissions limits while
also mandating the techniques used to achieve, monitor, and report
those limits.' 4 All this must be pinned down in a permit to be secured by
a business before going into operation. 15 To get the permit, a source
must pay a tax sufficient to keep the regulators in business.' 6 Also, if the
source needs to change what it produces or how it operates, which can
happen every few weeks in this computer age, the source must first secure
an amended permit. 17 This can take months or years. Any pollution
source that deviates from this detailed system of control commits an
offense punishable by civil sanctions and, in many cases also by criminal
sanctions, even if no harm was done. 18
This system contrasts sharply with how our legal system traditionally
discouraged antisocial activity. As a rough generality, if you acted wrongly
but caused no harm, you paid token damages or nothing at all. No harm,
no foul. If you did wrongly cause damage, you paid for it but were not
punished unless you did something society judged awful. Because only
awful conduct was deemed criminal, ignorance of the law was no
defense-you should have known better. Such an approach would not
work for many modern environmental problems because it is hard for
judges to place a dollar value on the harm done by most pollutants. Even
so, the intrusive system of control that we now have would be unnecessary
but for the idea that the regulators in Washington, D.C., must control
everything.
Without remote control from Washington, we could dispense with
the flood of regulations flowing down the federal chain of command.
States and cities, if left to their own devices, would not adopt such a com-
pulsive style of environmental regulation-one in which EPA officials
seem to be trying to make rules in Washington for every possible contin-
gency that might arise across the land. State and local officials would be
more prone to assess particular problems as they arise and decide what
should be done, just as sensible human beings handle issues that arise in
their personal lives. Local officials, working with the plant operators and
neighbors of a pollution source, could craft solutions that make sense in
the context of the specific problem. That is impossible when all solutions
must hew to federal rules.
14 Id. §§ 7661-7661c.
15 Id. § 7661a(a).
16 Id. § 7661a(b)(3).
17 Id. § 7661b.
18 Id. § 7413(b), (c).
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III. THREE COSTS
The top-down system of environmental protection increases the cost
of regulation in three ways: by choosing inefficient ways to reduce pollu-
tion, by increasing the burden of dealing with environmental regulators,
and by imposing higher burdens on new competitors.
A. The Cost of an Inefficient Mix of Emission Limits
The top-down approach is inefficient because it takes the authority
to decide how to protect the environment away from those with the most
local knowledge. Economic theory teaches that local knowledge is essen-
tial to efficiency. Experience teaches the same lesson. Witness the disaster
of central planning in the Soviet Union. Yet, according to Professor Rich-
ard Stewart, a former trustee of the Environmental Defense Fund, the
EPA system "has grown to the point where it amounts to nothing less than
a massive effort at Soviet-style planning of the economy to achieve envi-
ronmental goals."' 9
There is no reason to think that such centralized planning should
work any better in running the American environment than in running
the Soviet economy. Professors Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey
speak for many liberal and conservative scholars in concluding that the
"command-and-control regulatory strategy ... has not set intelligent pri-
orities .... has squandered resources devoted to environmental quality,
• * * has discouraged environmentally superior technologies, and .. . has
imposed unnecessary penalties on innovation and investment."20 No won-
der. People sitting in Washington, D.C., are trying to choreograph all of
the environmentally-related activities in the United States in the face of
wide disparities in local conditions and ceaseless changes in our under-
standing of pollution dangers and pollution-control technology.
Moreover, our centralized planners, unlike their Soviet counterparts,
have to brook the interference of members of Congress doing casework
for constituents and contributors and the intervention of federal judges.
As Stewart puts it, the federal chain of command is a self-contradictory
attempt at central planning through litigation.2 1
Scholars holding diverse political perspectives have suggested pollu-
tion taxes, emissions trading, greater reliance on the common law, and
other radical alternatives to Washington's command-and-control
approach. Others, such as former EPA Administrator William Ruckel-
shaus, have criticized the federal government's practice of imposing sepa-
rate regulatory schemes for air pollution, water pollution, and other types
19 Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives,
13 COLUM. J. ENv-rL. L. 153, 154 (1988).
20 HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 1 (1996).
21 Stewart, supra note 19, at 153-62.
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of pollution. 2 2 They suggest, instead, that plants be looked at holistically
in order to produce better overall environmental quality at lower costs.
Such innovation is practically impossible without local control.
The potential savings from local flexibility are immense. Amoco and
EPAjointly studied the operation of one refinery to determine the conse-
quences of allowing more flexibility.23 The study found that the refinery
could achieve "about 97 percent of the release reductions that regulatory
and statutory programs require.., for about 25 percent of today's costs
for these programs."24 These huge savings came from the refinery opera-
tors being freed from regulatory restrictions on how they reduced total
emissions. Similarly, many systematic academic studies suggest that more
market-oriented approaches could produce the same environmental
quality now being achieved at only one-quarter of the present cost.25
Savings three-quarters of pollution control costs to get the same pol-
lution control result would make a huge different because we now spend
$1,850 per household per year on the capital and operating costs of pol-
lution control equipment.2 6
Why is it that market-based approaches can produce such huge sav-
ings? Instead of regulators telling sources how to reduce emissions by
assigning unalterable emission limits to each smokestack at a factory and
specifying in pollution permits the means to control emissions at each
smokestack, regulators could allow sources to pick the best way of reduc-
ing overall emissions at each factory. The sources, rather than the regula-
tors, have the most local knowledge about the best way to reduce total
emissions from their plants and the financial incentive to use that knowl-
edge to pick the most efficient means to comply. It was this type of flexi-
bility that allowed Amoco to save so much money at its refinery.27
Moreover, instead of regulators assigning unalterable emission limits
to each source, regulators could allow sources to trade emission rights
among themselves. Sources also have a strong financial incentive to trade
so that pollution reduction would be done by the sources that could do it
with the least expense. Again, the sources, rather than the regulators,
have the most local knowledge about the cheapest way to reduce total
emissions from all plants in the area.
22 Barry G. Rabe, An Empirical Examination of Innovations in Integrated
Environmental Management: The Case of the Great Lakes Basin, 56 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 372,
372-81 (1996).
23 HowARD KLEE, JR. & MAHESH PODAR, AMoco/USEPA POLLUTION PREVENTION
PROJECT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I (rev. ed., 1992).
24 Id. at v.
25 See, e.g., TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE
ECONOMICS 362-63 (5th ed. 2000).
26 See EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTMENTS: THE COST OF A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT 2-
1 (1991) (cost estimates); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1995 tbls. 17, 65 (115th ed. 1995) (population and household estimates).
27 KLEE & PODAR, supra note 23, at 11.
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Going from the top-down to the bottom-up approach to environ-
mental protection is not the same as adopting a market-based approach
that could cut pollution control costs by three-quarters. Some states and
localities might still use command-and-control regulation. Even so, com-
mand-and-control regulation at the state and local level is likely to be
more efficient than the federally mandated version because the states and
municipalities have more local knowledge and would have the freedom
to adapt regulations to local conditions.
More fundamentally, states and localities have every reason to
explore flexible alternatives to command-and-control regulation because
they feel the pressure to find efficient means to accommodate environ-
mental and economic concerns. In contrast, EPA inevitably resists flexible
approaches in order to maintain its own power. States are more open to
real experimentation, and it makes more sense to experiment one state at
a time. State and local environmental agencies continue to develop inno-
vative approaches to every type of pollution problem despite federal man-
dates consuming such a large proportion of their energy and resources.
The drive exists at the state and local level for the same reason that states
and localities spearheaded environmental improvement before 1970-
officials closest to the citizens who experience the pollution and to the
facilities that are regulated are most aware of need to find sensible solu-
tions. These innovations have largely gone unrecognized because, until
recently, the state and local agencies lacked any collective apparatus for
publicizing their accomplishments. Now, however, the fledgling Environ-
mental Council of the States, an association of state environmental com-
missioners, is beginning to get the story out.2 8 In contrast, EPA spends
heavily on self-promotion.
B. The Cost of Red Tape
The $1,850 annual per household pollution control spending figure
accounts only for the cost of buying and operating pollution control
equipment. It does not account for other burdens of environmental regu-
lation. One such burden is that sources must go through complex
bureaucratic procedures.
To get some feel for the scope of the bureaucratic complexity, it is
useful to consider the quantity of words that flows down the chain of
command. At the top is a thick volume of statutes in fine print. As the
cascade flows by EPA, it spreads to fill a two-foot shelf of volumes of
agency regulations. The EPA regulations are so lengthy partly because
those who write them respond more to pressures from within the Agency
to enlarge and protect its power than to the public's need for clear, con-
cise rules. The problem is not that EPA is over solicitous of the environ-
ment; it is that EPA is over solicitous of itself. So, the regulations construe
28 See, e.g., Envtl. Council of States, Innovative Ideas, at http://www.sso.org/
ecos/publications/innovate.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2001).
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the Agency's power as broadly as possible and then respond to the obvi-
ous instances of overreaching by providing a slew of narrowly defined
exceptions. Thus, under a statute regulating the handling of hazardous
wastes, the Agency takes seventeen pages to define the term "hazardous
waste." 29 The definition reads as if it were written by Monty Python'sJohn
Cleese.
As the cascade of words goes by the lower reaches of EPA, it spreads
out still further in the form of EPA "guidance" documents-one can see
why guidance is necessary. One subset of the guidance documents for
one of the dozens of federal statutes, Superfund, 30 fills thirteen loose-leaf
notebooks. There are probably twice as many guidance documents for
that particular statute, but no one knows for sure because the agency
itself has been unable to assemble a complete collection.
As the paper flood reaches the states, it spreads still further in the
form of state legislation and state regulations, all of which must take the
form mandated by federal instructions. The cascade keeps spreading.
The states must submit plans to EPA to show that the federal instructions
will be implemented. The plans are not usually documents in the ordi-
nary sense of the word; they are often filing cabinets full of submissions
from the state to EPA officials. Finally, state and local governments and
pollution sources must submit reports to EPA to show that the federal
instructions were carried out.
A single federal regulation that occupies only a few pages in EPA
regulations that occupy two feet of shelf space may reflect years of admin-
istrative and judicial proceedings involving the labor of hundreds of
employees of federal agencies and contractors. Hundreds or thousands of
employees of state and local government and businesses are also necessa-
rily involved. These are predominantly employees of large, established
businesses. Small and emerging businesses generally cannot afford to be
involved or even to support trade associations able to represent them ade-
quately in most regulatory proceedings that have an impact on them.
Small and emerging businesses are under-represented and under-
informed and, thus, at an aggravated risk of making investments that will
get them into trouble with the regulators. Moreover, once promulgated,
the regulations set in motion requirements for paperwork that, in itself,
does nothing to clean the environment.
Big corporations can live with government by ideal. In truth, they
often come to like it. They can cope with its complications because they
have in-house staffs and outside lawyers, often hired away from public
interest groups and EPA. These specialists know that their livelihoods
come from their knowledge of the fine print in the chain of command.
Of course, the corporations must pay for these specialists and for the pol-
29 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1994), 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.30-.38 (2000).
30 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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lution control itself. However, because all large competitors bear a similar
burden, the costs can be passed along to consumers.
The compulsive system of crime and punishment is more of a prob-
lem for state and local governments, farmers, and small and emerging
businesses. Homeowners or other property owners with, for example, wet-
lands, asbestos, lead paint, or radon problems, are also harmed. Unlike
large corporations, these people are not well equipped to deal with
highly complex regulatory requirements.
A small and emerging business operating one modest plant must
often decode almost as much regulatory complexity as a large corpora-
tion running twenty large plants. In many smaller businesses, the chal-
lenge of dealing with the bureaucracy falls upon the owner-operator. It is
not that the owner-operator understands the regulations; he or she sim-
ply does not know enough to tell a subordinate how to deal with the
problem.
The pollution control costs made unnecessarily high by EPA's top-
down approach harm small businesses disproportionately. By comparing
the impact of environmental regulation on industries with large pollution
abatement costs and small pollution abatement costs, Peter Pashigian
found: "compliance with environmental laws .. . has placed a greater
burden on small than on large plants. Small plants have found it more
difficult to compete and survive with larger plants under environmental
regulation.... [T] he evidence suggest that environmental regulation not
only terminated but reversed the erosion of the larger plants' market
share due to the entry and success of small plants." 3 1
Before 1970, progress was being made on pollution with far less
paperwork. Although the paperwork is itself a vast waste of human time
and talent, its greatest importance is as a marker of something more sub-
tle: the loss of flexibility that comes from trying to run society on military
lines.
No major facility can hope to avoid violating such a compulsive sys-
tem of legally binding requirements. As a recently published environmen-
tal law treatise acknowledges, "[I]t is virtually impossible for a major
company (or government facility) to be in complete compliance with all
regulatory requirements. [And yet] virtually every instance of noncompli-
ance can be readily translated into a [criminal] violation. '32 Some envi-
ronmental crimes do not require EPA to show intent, but only that some
regulatory obligation was not fulfilled. Government now uses the criminal
law, civil penalties, and other sanctions to punish much conduct that is
neither harmful nor intentional and that ordinary people would not
think reprehensible. Since violators are susceptible to fines of up to
$25,000 per day for each violation, and because one course of conduct
31 Peter Pashigian, The Effect of Environmental Regulation on Plant Size and Factor
Shares, 27J.L. & ECON. 1, 25-26 (1984).
32 CHRISTOPHER HARIUS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES 1-8 (1992).
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can often lead to multiple violations 3 3 EPA can send them bills for huge
sums. Even if the conduct is harmless and unintentional, the pressure on
the innocent to settle is enormous. EPA thus ends up with the power of
life and death over many small and emerging businesses. Even if this dis-
cretion is abused only rarely by EPA, the very existence of their looming,
opaque power chills those who would start or enlarge a business.
Small and emerging businesses would find it easier to understand
regulatory requirements under a system that was not nationally con-
trolled. Freed from strictures designed to force them to hew to the
national system, state and local governments could adopt simpler pro-
grams with less onerous paperwork requirements. The county or local
level official in charge of implementing such programs would probably
understand the full range of regulatory requirements. In contrast, under
the present system, a small business that calls EPA with a question is likely
to reach someone thousands of miles away who, in trying to divine an
answer, is also overwhelmed by the flood of information on EPA's
website.
C. The Cost of Stricter Controls on New Sources
Emerging businesses face an additional problem: EPA usually puts
tougher pollution control requirements on new sources. This means that
emerging businesses that want to enter a new market face an additional
barrier to entry, the preferential treatment of established firms. No won-
der that, when EPA announces new regulatory initiatives, the share prices
of regulated firms often go up.3 4
It is also no wonder that national environmental regulation tilts the
playing field in favor of existing sources of pollution. Large national cor-
porations and large unions can pay the day-to-day attention to regulatory
politics needed to extract the deals that entrench their positions. Regard-
less of their other disagreements, one thing they can agree upon is to
suppress competition.
There is a less sinister explanation for tougher controls on new
plants: it costs less to equip a new plant to meet any given pollution stan-
dard than it does to retrofit an old plant to do the same. Therefore, it is
argued that new plants should be made as clean as they reasonably can
be. This however, could be done without stacking the deck against new
plants. Pollution limits could be set somewhere between those currently
imposed on new and existing sources, and existing sources could be
allowed to buy excess pollution rights from the new sources that can
more than meet the emission limits. The counter-argument to this is that
buying pollution rights would cut into profits and wages at existing
plants, perhaps even making them uneconomical. Even if this is true, at
3 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1994).
34 BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT:
CREATING WEALTH IN HUMMINGBIRD ECONOMIES 66, 70-71 (1997).
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least now we know what we are talking about: protecting existing plants
from competition.
One might think that EPA would also argue that it is wrong to allow
for the buying and selling of pollution rights. But, no, the Clean Air Act
actually mandates such buying and selling, with the requirement that new
entrants not only meet tougher standards than existing sources, but also
that they buy pollution rights for whatever little they do emit from
existing firms.35 That is suppression of competition with a vengeance.
Protectionist regulation is not the exclusive province of national reg-
ulatory agencies. State and local legislatures engage in it, too. Nonethe-
less, the danger is much greater when the regulation is done nationally.
An existing firm may well get regulation in its own state to protect it from
competition in that state, but it is far less likely to get regulations in other
states to protect it everywhere.
Nationally applicable new source requirements were mandated in
the Clean Air Act in order to suppress interstate competition. The pri-
mary support for the provisions of the Clean Air Act imposing tougher
national emission limits on new sources came from rust-belt legislators
responding to constituents who wanted to make it difficult for local firms
to relocate to other states. 36 Analyses of the overall voting behavior of
these legislators suggest that their motivation was to protect constituents
from economic loss, not to protect the environment from pollution.3 7
IV. EPA'S REACTION
EPA feels compelled by public resentment of its heavy hand to claim
that it favors experiments and flexibility. EPA Administrator Carol
Browner's list of "Recent EPA Accomplishments" was headed by items
claiming to ease regulatory burdens.38 She claimed that the Agency cut
fifteen million hours of required paperwork for business and communi-
ties at the beginning of 1995 and would cut another eight million hours
by the end of 1996. According to Browner's account, the majority of the
eliminated requirements were unnecessary. There is no explanation of
why the Agency imposed unnecessary requirements in the first place or
how many hours of paperwork are still required.
Browner also pointed to Project XL, the Common Sense Initiative,
and the Environmental Leadership Program as evidence of greater EPA
innovation and flexibility. These programs promise that EPA will give
businesses and communities flexibility in how they meet environmental
15 42 U.S.C. §§ 7503(c), 7651b(e).
16 Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431, 460
(1989).
31 See id. at 460-61.
38 Carol A. Browner, Recent EPA Accomplishments, August 15, 1997, at http://
www.epa.gov/epahome/accomp.htm (on file with author).
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requirements if they can show they will use the flexibility to improve per-
formance beyond existing standards. These programs let EPA embrace all
the right buzzwords yet retain control.
EPA does not make these programs widely available, and according
to a report from the National Academy of Public Administration, the
paperwork requirements to qualify are so cumbersome that few busi-
nesses or communities find them worthwhile. 39 Commissioner Peder Lar-
son of the Minnesota Pollution Control Board said that EPA makes the
bureaucratic obstacles to get into these special projects so large that cor-
porations generally get involved "only because the chief executive officer
is personally interested, not because there is any payoff for their bottom
line."40
In short, EPA is out to co-opt the flexibility issue rather than give up
any real power. The Agency's true intent became apparent after state
commissioners seized upon the 1996 election promises of President Clin-
ton and Vice President Gore to let states and businesses find smarter,
cheaper ways of protecting the environment. Prior to the election, the
commissioners got the blessings of Administrator Browner to negotiate
with EPA staff to "reinvent government." Four months of hard bargaining
produced a sixteen-page agreement allowing the states to deviate from
rigid federal requirements if and only if EPA agreed that such innova-
tions would save money and not harm environmental quality.41
Suddenly, after the election, in February 1997, the EPA official in
charge of the talks killed the deal. In a "Dear Reinvention Ombudsper-
sons" letter, Deputy Administrator Fred Hansen wrote that the states
would be allowed to try "minor, and I stress minor, changes. ' 42 Moreover,
EPA would get to decide how the states' savings would be spent. This last
demand took real gall because it makes clear that EPA's true objective
was to maintain its share of power over the national economy rather than
to enforce environmental standards. The next day, the commissioners
fired back a letter about "damaged trust" and "gross error. '4 "3
Why did EPA insult the state agencies? It had good reason to fear
that the states would succeed. The philosophy of reinventing govern-
ment, if taken seriously, is that those closer to a problem can better solve
" NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., RESOLVING THE PARADOX OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: AN AGENDA FOR CONGRESS, EPA, & THE STATES 35 (1997).
40 Interview with Peder Larson, Commissioner, Minnesota Pollution Control
Board (Sept. 18, 1997).
41 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY AND SEC'Y OF STATE, JOINT EPA/STATE AGREEMENT TO
PURSUE REGULATORY INNOVATION (Feb. 12, 1997) (manuscript on file with author).
42 Letter from Fred Hansen, Deputy Administrator, EPA, to Reinvention
Ombudspersons (Feb. 1997) (on file with author).
13 Letter from the Environmental Council of the States to Carol Browner,
Administrator, and Fred Hansen, Deputy Administrator, EPA (Feb. 26, 1997) (on file
with author). The letter was signed by the president of the Environmental Council of
the States, Georgia Commissioner Harold Reheis, and the environmental
commissioners of New Jersey, New Hampshire, Illinois, Minnesota, and Arkansas.
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it. Given the opportunity, the states might well reduce environmental
costs without sacrificing environmental quality. Freed from the national
chain of command, states and cities would have the freedom to adopt
local measures to meet local environmental protection needs with sensi-
tivity to the constraints felt by local sources.
V. WHAT THE WORLD WOULD LOOK LIKE
WITHOUT THESE COSTS
What is the collective price we pay for EPA's heavy hand? Anecdotes
provide no enduring answer because every anecdote is only an invitation
for an equal and opposite anecdote. Nor does trying to accumulate all
the anecdotes into statistics prove very convincing, save to the already
convinced. The loss presented as a large number proceeded by a dollar
sign is merely an intangible abstraction. It is not as if people think that
they had something and it was taken away. The loss does not seem real
because people have no picture of what they were supposed to have lost.
With no clear image of the loss, people revert to the default assumption
that talk of such numbers, however astronomical, is just another form of
the sucker proposition, "Let's trade your health to make me money."
One way to enable people to imagine how they personally could ben-
efit from a different approach to pollution control would be to ask them
to consider whether they would be worse off today if the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC) had never relinquished its top-down control
of telecommunications.
FCC once insisted, as EPA now does, that everything in its domain
proceed according to its detailed rules. It required, as EPA still does, that
no change take place except with its prior approval. FCC was once wel-
comed by established corporations, as EPA is now, as a means of protec-
tion from competition by small and emerging business. 44
One of the chief beneficiaries of that protection in telecommunica-
tions was the old Bell telephone system in which, under one corporate
umbrella, the Baby Bells provided local service, AT&T provided long dis-
tance service, Western Electric manufactured telecommunications equip-
ment, and Bell Labs developed new technology. This telecommunications
giant benefited from FCC regulation in many ways, including enjoying a
government imposed monopoly in long distance service. 45 FCC opened
that market to competition only in the 1960s and then very slowly.4 6 Most
people in the 1960s could not have imagined that phone calls across the
country would ever be as cheap as they are today. Consider the loss to
society, to the ability of people to associate with each other over long
distances, if FCC had kept the AT&T monopoly in place.
4" PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET
COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM 26, 30 (1997).
45 Id. at 36.
46 Id. at 80.
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FCC not only protected the long distance monopoly, it also tightly
controlled what equipment could be attached to the telecommunications
network. Today, consumers have a wide choice of telephones, answering
machines, faxes, modem-equipped computers, and other devices that
they can attach to their telephone jacks. Most people are too young to
remember the time when there was no choice. FCC forbade customers
attaching anything to the telephone system that did not have the commis-
sion's prior approval. That prior approval was not freely given and, in any
event, was slow to come. As Peter Huber writes,
[I]n 1954 the FCC invoked the full majesty and authority of the
federal government to block sales of the Hush-A-Phone. It was a
small metal cup sold by a tiny independent company. The cup
attached to the mouthpiece of a telephone, providing a bit of pri-
vacy and quiet in a crowded office. The FCC said it was a "foreign
attachment," a competing network that was attempting to intercon-
nect with Bell. And competition was illegal.
47
As a federal court held in 1956, there was, of course, no good reason
why customers should not use Hush-A-Phone if they wished. 48 The point
is not that Hush-A-Phone got its way in the end, but that it took nine years
for it to do so-seven years before FCC and two years before the court.
4 9
The delay, cost, and uncertainty of the administrative process discour-
aged people with ideas for new and better telecommunications equip-
ment from even trying to put them into practice. FCC's insistence that it
be the gatekeeper to decide what could be attached to the phone net-
work denied choice to consumers and denied opportunity for small and
emerging business.
The public harm was small in Hush-A-Phone's case, but far larger in
others. FCC's ban on foreign attachments to telephone company lines
applied first and foremost to telephone handsets. In most of the country,
consumers had to rent their telephones from the Bell system at exorbi-
tant rates. For many decades, the choice of color was limited: black or
black. If one wanted a long cord between the mouthpiece and the base, it
had to be rented from AT&T at a price that made it a luxury even among
the well-to-do. In the 1950s, in what was at the time a giant concession to
consumer choice, Ma Bell introduced a choice of colors, and for big
spenders, the Princess telephone. FCC finally allowed customers to install
their own telephones in 1975.50 If FCC had relented in 1956 when it first
considered the issue, rather than almost twenty years later, customers
would have saved $3 billion. 51
47 Id. at xiv.
4 Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
49 HUBER, supra note 44, at 38 (reporting that the commission process took seven
years).
50 Id. at 79.
51 Id.
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That was real money back then, but this loss is trivial next to what we
would have lost had FCC regulated the Internet, as it could have.5 2 Fortu-
nately, FCC bowed out and let the Internet go its largely unregulated way.
The Internet depends critically on attaching foreign devices, such as
modem-equipped computers and servers, to the telecommunications net-
work. If the Internet had been subject to FCC's molasses-slow approval
process, where approval of Hush-A-Phones took nine years and the con-
sumer choice of telephones almost twenty years, the dramatic growth of
the Internet would have been impossible. For the Internet, twenty weeks
is a long time, twenty months is the long term, and twenty years is an
eternity. The Internet's genius is in having no one genius. Anyone,
including a cash poor teenager, has an opportunity to offer new and bet-
ter ways of doing things on the Internet. No prior approval is required
from FCC or any other gatekeeper. Such opportunity for inventiveness
would be impossible if FCC had exercised its regulatory prerogatives.
Everyone knows, and an FCC study now acknowledges, that FCC's
top-down approach would have stunted the Internet revolution.5 3 But,
because FCC relinquished its gatekeeper prerogatives, the United States
leads the Internet revolution.
Whether FCC bowed out of regulating the Internet voluntarily, or as
quickly and completely as it should, is beside the point for the purpose of
pointing out that there is much to be lost by EPA's failing to give up its
top-down approach. Just as continued control by FCC would have stunted
the Internet, EPA's maintaining of its superfluous power stunts improve-
ments in the huge range of activities under EPA's thumb. Instead of run-
ning all pollution control the EPA way, state and local governments
would be free to craft local solutions to local problems. Good ideas tried
out in one place could be adopted in other areas. Instead of requiring
every source to obtain a permit and meet emission limits issued under
EPA's aegis, states would be free to adopt market based pollution control
schemes in which the needed pollution reduction could be achieved at
the points where it could be done most economically. Small and emerg-
ing businesses would have a fairer chance to compete instead of being
squelched by EPA's bias in favor of established polluters and by the barri-
ers to entry created by EPA's paperwork requirements.
EPA protests that states and sources can deviate from generally appli-
cable rules, if they get prior approval. However, EPA doles out slack retail
and begrudgingly. As it has made all too clear, EPA is open only to
"minor, and I stress minor, changes."5 4 EPA staffers are fundamentally
hostile to giving up control, as found by the National Academy of Public
52 JASON OXMAN, OFFICE OF PLANS AND POLICY, WORKING PAPER No. 31, FED.
COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, THE FCC AND THE UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET 16
(1999).
53 Id. at 18.
5' Letter from Fred Hansen, supra note 42.
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Administration. 55 States and pollution sources looking for leeway from
EPA are fundamentally in the same position as Hush-A-Phone was in
1947-they will have to wait a long time for the Agency to say, "You may
take one baby step."
There are, of course, differences as well as similarities between the
hegemony of EPA and that of FCC. One difference is that the pace of
progress in pollution control technology is not apt to be as explosive as
that in telecommunications technology. It was because of that explosive
pace that FCC had to let go. EPA can and is holding on with all its might.
Another difference is that FCC stymied one kind of technology, telecom-
munications, while EPA control stymies innovations in almost every
goods-producing sector of the economy. While FCC's control would have
stunted an explosive innovation in one sector, EPA's control pervasively
stunts innovation.
VI. "OUR JOY," NOT "THEIR COST"
The weight of EPA's unnecessarily heavy hand falls primarily on us
and our joy rather than on corporate fat cats and their purses. Although
the direct costs of EPA's requirements fall in the first instance on existing
firms, those who pay the price in the end are primarily ordinary people.
For example, auto buyers, not auto manufacturers, pay most of the cost of
emissions controls on new cars. 56 More generally, ordinary people pay for
most of the direct costs of environmental pollution control by way of
higher prices for goods, higher taxes, and less pay. To the extent that the
direct costs of pollution control are reflected in the bottom lines of cor-
porations, most of us are adversely affected anyway because so many of us
now own shares of corporate stock, directly or through various pension
plans.
As the analogy between EPA and FCC helps to illustrate, even more
important than the direct costs of EPA regulations are the indirect costs
that stifle innovation, principally by small and emerging business. If FCC
had been able to maintain its power to stop innovations in telecommuni-
cations except when previously approved by regulators in Washington,
D.C., we would have no Internet nor all the things the Internet brings us,
from email to dot-coms. The monetary loss would have been immense.
The market value of only one such company, Red Hat, was $8 billion one
month after going public. 57 Add quite a few zeroes to that number to get
a sense of what investors made from all Internet companies. The huge
sum that investors have made, even after the market plunge, is a proxy for
the value that the Internet provides to everyone, value that would have
been lost if FCC had remained in charge.
55 Nat'l Acad. of Pub. Admin., supra note 39, at 35.
56 CRANDALL, supra note 7, at 20.
57 RANDALL E. STROSS, E-Boys 289 (2000).
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These facts provide a perspective to understand the true dimension
of the indirect costs of environmental regulation. The $1,850 per house-
hold paid annually to buy and operate pollution control equipment
reflects only the direct costs of pollution control and does not include the
indirect costs of having to deal with the bureaucracy and the discrimina-
tion against new sources. By stifling innovation, the Clean Air Act and the
Clean Water Act have had, according to Michael Hazilla and Raymond
Kopp, a large and accumulating impact on national income-a two per-
cent loss in annual income by 1981 and six percent loss by 1990.58
Because EPA's control continues to hamper innovation, these losses will
continue to grow at a compound rate. Extrapolating these compounding
losses to the present would produce a loss amounting to more than a ten
percent reduction in annual income. This estimate accounts for only the
two most important environmental statutes. There are dozens more.
The comparison between pollution control and telecommunications
regulation also helps to illustrate that the loss from EPA's heavy hand falls
primarily on ordinary people rather than on corporate fat cats. The great
bulk of the newly minted Internet millionaires-from geeks with vision to
clerical employees who happened to be in the right place at the right
time-did not start as fat cats. Most would say all the more power to these
new millionaires because they did not make their money by taking things
from us, but rather by offering us things that we wanted. Similarly, the
small and emerging businesses squelched by EPA's top-down control
could have provided opportunity and fortune to many more people with
great ideas or simple good luck.
The comparison between pollution control and telecommunications
regulation further demonstrates that the primary loss is not dollars. For
consumers, the dollars are surrogates for things that facilitate the pursuit
of happiness in their own way: a wider choice of goods, services, and
information, as well as time-savings and increased flexibility in how they
live their lives. For those who make their living via the Internet, their
opportunities bring not just money, but also an outlet for their talents
and sociability. Unnecessarily restrictive government regulation, whether
in telecommunications or pollution control, restricts opportunities for
small and emerging business.
Some people questing for these opportunities decide to proceed any-
way, albeit illegally. They become new recruits to the underground econ-
omy. Others do not go underground, but cut corners and are left
worrying about getting caught. Most, however, stay where they are, cogs
in large organizations. The large organizations provide the capacity to
deal with the government-imposed complication, but at the price of
doing things the organization's way. Small and emerging businesses are
right to see EPA as their enemy.
518 Michael Hazilla & Raymond J. Kopp, Social Cost of Environmental Quality
Regulations: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 98 J. POL. ECON. 853, 867 (1990).
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I do not want to exaggerate. Plainly, small businesses do continue to
flourish. But the drag on individual initiative and creativity is real. When
innovators from the private or public sectors explain their success in find-
ing new or better ways to provide people with what they want, the stories
they tell often show that it was tougher jumping through the regulatory
hoops than coming up with or implementing the idea itself. The untold
stories are those of the innovations that died because getting the permits
was just too expensive, time-consuming, or discouraging. It is a sign of the
times that the artists Christo and Jeanne-Claude, whose projects include
wrapping public monuments in gossamer fabrics, make their years-long
efforts to get the necessary permits part of the work of art.59 In art, as in
life, government is a drag on individual creativity.
When the state throttles individual initiative, we lose something even
more precious than money and what it can buy. We lose society. Marvin
Devino, my nearest neighbor in upstate New York, fixes the tractors and
trucks of local farmers and loggers not just for money, but also for com-
pany. When he complained of being too busy, I told him, as I had learned
as a good intellectual, that he might be able to work less and earn more
by raising his prices. His reply: "But then I wouldn't get to see my
friends."
Legislation by ideal implemented by top-down control is puritanical.
It upholds virtue in the sense of pious adherence to notions of purity, but
destroys virtue in the sense of using our personal powers to express our-
selves to the fullest. And it does so relentlessly. As the philosopher C. S.
Lewis wrote,
Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its
victims may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under
robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies. The rob-
ber baron's cruelty may sometime sleep, his cupidity may at some
point be satiated; but those who torment us for our own good will
torment us without end for they do so with the approval of their
own conscience. They may be more likely to go to Heaven yet at
the same time likelier to make a Hell of earth. Their very kindness
stings with intolerable insult. To be "cured" against one's will and
cured of a state we may not regard as disease is to be put on a level
with those who have not yet reached the age of reason or those
who never will; to be classed with infants, imbeciles, and domestic
animals. 60
59 Peter Blank, Christo and Jeanne-Claude, Stanford Presidential Lectures &
Symposia in Humanities & Arts, at http://prelectur.stanford.edu/lecturers/christo/
index.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2001).
60 C.S. LEwIS, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in GOD IN THE DOCK: EssAYs
ON THEOLOGY AND ETHICS 287, 292 (Walter Hooper ed., 1970).
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VII. CONCLUSION
"Comment voulez-vous gouverner un pays qui a deux cent quarente-
six varits de fromage?" [How would you wish to govern a country with
two hundred forty-six varieties of cheese.] 6 1
The cheeses to which President Charles de Gaulle referred were not
the rubbery blobs extruded in lactofactories, but creamy glories molded
by artisans in 246 French communities. With the freedom to make their
cheeses their own way, these artisans found self-expression, self-esteem,
and, no doubt, on occasion, joy. The opposition of such artisans to
detailed directives from on high symbolized for de Gaulle grass roots
resistance to the drive of elite French officials in Paris to run the country
neatly and from the top down.
The Environmental Protection Agency has subjected the United
States to a regime of pollution control that is as neat and top-down as it
can make it. Along the way, we have lost opportunities for the self-expres-
sion, self-esteem, and joy symbolized by the 246 glorious cheeses. These
losses are real, even though there is no hard number to attach to them.
The federal government maintains no network to monitor opportunity
for the self-expression, self-esteem, and joy. No doubt it would if some
federal agency had a mandate and a budget to achieve an ambient stan-
dard for the pursuit of happiness. 62 Such a mandate is less conceivable
than a dictat putting a health warning on creamy cheeses.
61 ERNEST MIGNON, LES MOTS DU GtNtRAL 57 (Librairie Arthime Fayard, 1962)
(quoting French President Charles de Gaulle).
612 EPA and other federal agencies are, however, mandated by the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (RFA), to assess the impact of their regulations on small businesses. 5
U.S.C. §§ 601, 603(a), 604(a)(5) (1994). In the course of promulgating stricter
national ambient air quality standards for ozone and particulate matter, EPA began to
produce such an assessment but then abandoned the project claiming that its
regulation "would not have a significant economic impact on small entities within the
meaning of the RFA." National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter,
62 Fed. Reg. 38,652, 38,702 (July 18, 1997); National Ambient Air Quality Standards
for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,887 (July 18, 1997). The regulations would, of
course, have a big impact on all business, big and small. EPA's excuse was legalistic: its
ambient standards would not directly regulate any business, but rather would force
states to regulate business and so did not have an economic impact within the
meaning of the RFA. Although the agency was correct that it was not itself regulating
small business, and the Court of Appeals so held, EPA was requiring that small
businesses be regulated more strictly. See Am. Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027
(D.C. Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457
(2001). EPA could, moreover, say a good bit about the impact on small businesses.
EPA knew enough about how much more strictly businesses would be regulated and
the shape of that regulation to produce a multi-volume cost-benefit analysis of the
standards. See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSES FOR THE PARTICULATE MATTER AND
OZONE AND NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QuALrrv STANDARDS AND PROPOSED REGIONAL
HAZE RULE (1999), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/naaqsfin/ria.html.
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